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The title and dust jacket portrait of Newton eliciting the celebrated phenomenon of col-
ors may lead one to think this is a comprehensive work on Newton’s scientific method,
including his experimental work in optics. The scope is narrower.
In the preface to the first edition of Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, New-
ton writes, “For the whole difficulty of philosophy appears to be to discover the forces of
nature from the phenomena and then to demonstrate the other phenomena from these
forces.” This program, for at least one force, is carried out in Book III of the Principia
wherein Newton claims to establish the law of universal gravity primarily from Keplerian
features of planetary and lunar motion and then to derive from this force the tides, the
shape of the earth, the precession of the equinoxes, lunar anomalies and other phenom-
ena. Harper’s book focuses on the first half of this project, giving for the most part a
running commentary with appendices on the first thirteen propositions of Book III and
their corollaries, together with the three laws of motion.
This is a serious and learned work that will set a standard for future philosophical
analyses of Newton’s argument for universal gravitation. However, though it is extensively
researched and filled with a wealth of historical detail, it will not set a new standard
for Newton scholarship in the stricter sense; for it fails to contextualize its subject. The
Principia went through three editions and the relevant portions of Book III saw significant
revisions over a span of forty years. Although Harper mentions many of the alterations,
he does not query into the reasons for these changes. The analysis is static, based on the
third edition. On top of Newton is added a pile of statistical analyses of the data used
and the parameters derived, all of which has a vindicatory upshot. Harper unabashedly
proselytizes the method he claims to unearth.
All told, I think Harper gets very much right. In what follows, though, I shall dwell on
some points and features I find especially wanting or off the mark.
The central message is that Newton’s method in Book III “adds features that significantly
enrich the basic hypothetico-deductive (HD) model of scientific method” (p. 373). To those
familiar with Newton’s hypotheses non fingo from the General Scholium added to the
second edition, this may ring out of tune. Newton was staunchly opposed to the method
of hypotheses, demanding instead that propositions about the causes and properties of
appearances, including the laws of motion, be inferred from the phenomena. Why is this
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not just antithetical to the HD model? So, why Harper speaks of Newton’s method as an
enrichment of hypothetico-deductivism is a bit of a mystery. It’s not as though Harper
does not emphasize these remarks from from the General Scholium. Perhaps, though, we
are simply to take it for granted that successful prediction ordinarily lends support to
theory. But there is no indication in Newton’s writings that he took this to be the case. To
the contrary Newton dismissed the method of hypotheses on the grounds that alternative
hypotheses are always available, and thus there should be no reason that a consequence of
a proposition should lend support qua consequence to that proposition as opposed to some
contrary proposition that also entails it.
Perhaps this is too much of a quibble. What are the additional features that “enrich” the
HD model? Harper lists three. (1) “An ideal of empirical success richer than prediction,”
i.e., “in addition to accurate prediction of the phenomena a theory purports to explain, the
richer ideal of empirical success requires that a theory have those phenomena accurately
measure the parameters which explain them.” (2) The conversion of “theoretical questions
into ones which can be empirically answer by measurement from phenomena.” (3) The
provisional acceptance of theoretical propositions inferred from phenomena as guides to
further research. Harper claims that “all three come together in a method of successive
approximation in which deviations from the model developed so far count as new theory-
mediated phenomena that aid in developing a more accurate successor model” (pp. 2-3,
italics in original).
Item (3) directly echos Newton’s fourth rule of reasoning: In experimental philosophy,
propositions gathered from the phenomena by induction should be considered either exactly
or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena
make such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions. Just how (2) is supposed
to differ from (1) is not altogether clear to me. We can see (1) in action in the first few
propositions of Book III.
From the three laws of motion, it follows in Book I that the centripetal force on a body
is directed toward a point in the interior of its orbit if and only if it sweeps out equal
areas in equal times with respect to that point. Moreover, slight deviations from the point
around which equal areas are swept yield slight deviations from the area law with respect
to the point of deviation. Thus the extent to which the area law holds with respect to
Jupiter measures the extent to which the force holding its satellites in orbit is directed
toward Jupiter. Since the area law for Jupiter is one of the six Phenomena of Book III in
the third edition, it follows that there is a centripetal force directed toward Jupiter holding
its satellites in orbit. This is an example of deduction from the phenomena. Similarly for
the primary planets with respect to the sun and the moon with respect to the earth.
It also follows in Book I that for circular orbits Kepler’s period law is satisfied if and
only if the centripetal force is an inverse square force. This establishes that the forces
keeping the moons of Jupiter and, at least to approximation, the planets in their orbits are
inverse square forces. More accurately the latter is established by the the quiescence of the
aphelia, which holds for nearly circular orbits if and only if the force is an inverse square
force. A similar argument applies to the moon. In general here, features of the motions
measure properties of the force while the force explains the motions.
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For the next two inferences, that it is the force of gravity holding (i) the moon and (ii)
the planets and their moons in orbit, Newton appeals to his first two rules of reasoning:
first, that we are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and
sufficient to explain the phenomena, and second, that therefore we must assign, as far as
possible, the same causes to the same natural effects. The status of these rules (and the
third rule, see below) poses a classic dilemma for Newton. If they are supposed to hold a
priori , then Newton cannot claim to be a strict empiricist; if they are empirically justified,
what is the evidence they lead to truth? Where Harper stands is unclear. He tells us, “that
the application of Newton’s first two rules of reasoning to argue from the moon-test to the
identification of the force holding the moon in its orbit with terrestrial gravity is backed up
by this ideal of empirical success,” where now this ideal includes the idea that “theoretical
parameters receive convergent accurate measurements from the phenomena [the theory]
purports to explain.” (p. 160) The “measurements” in this case are the rate of free fall
of terrestrial objects and the rate of fall the moon would have at the surface of the earth
on the assumption of an inverse square law force. Given the law of universal gravity, these
indeed would count as convergent measurements of the same parameter. But the rules
are applied on the way to deriving the law. At that stage of the argument we have two
parameters and we are seeking a justification for treating them as a single parameter. If
the rules are sound, then we are justified.
Newton completes his argument for the law of universal gravitation in two more steps.
First, he argues that all bodies are gravitationally attracted to every planet, and that the
strength of the attraction is proportional to the mass of the attracted body (Proposition
6). Oddly, Newton gives no argument for the first conjunct. He does argue as Corollary II
that, universally, all bodies on or near the earth gravitate toward the earth, and justifies it
by his third rule of reasoning, that those qualities of bodies that cannot be intended and
remitted and that belong to all bodies on which experiments can be made should be taken
as qualities of all bodies universally. This is the only application of the third rule in the
Principia. Harper, though, has it that Newton applies the third rule for the first conjunct.
Perhaps he should have, but it is still a fact, however ugly, that he did not. Second, Newton
argues that all bodies have a power of gravitational attraction proportional to their mass.
Harper marks this as “the conceptual transition from gravity as centripetal forces toward
planets to gravity as a universal force of pair-wise attraction between bodies” (p. 290)
Harper also writes:
The extension to include interactive gravitation of bodies toward parts of
planets would count, in Newton’s day, as an extension to include interactive
gravitation between all bodies within reach of experiments. This makes
Rule 3 endorse extending interactive gravity to all bodies universally. (p.
41)
However, Newton does not invoke the third rule in the proof of this proposition. Harper
also cites the third rule (and the fourth) in his discussion of Newton’s evidence for the
third law of motion. Of course, the rules of reasoning appear only at the outset of Book
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III. So much has to be considered as counterfactual history of what Newton might have or
ought to have done.
By failing to contextualize, though, Harper misses the whole point for the introduction
of the third rule. As he duly notes, the first three rules are introduced as rules only in the
second edition and the fourth rule in the third. In the first edition the first two appear as
Hypotheses I and II, respectively, and instead of the third rule there is a Hypothesis III
that reads, “Any body can be turned into another body of whatever kind, and can assume
successively every degree of quality in between.” This Hypothesis is subsequently used in
the proof of Corollary II of Proposition 6 (and only in that proof). The argument is that if
the ether or any other body were devoid of gravity, that quantity of matter could gradually
be changed into a body that does have weight, and thus whether a body has weight depends
on its form. But it was established in Corollary I that the weights of bodies do not depend
on their forms or textures. Thus, the purpose of Corollary II, and thus of the third rule,
is to argue against any vortex theory of gravity, which would have the weight of bodies
result from a pressure exerted on them by a swirling subtle matter. The subtle matter
itself must have weight. This is completely lost on Harper, who takes the universality to
concern bodies “however far they may be away from the earth” (p. 280).
The Hypotheses of the first edition are nine in number. Hypotheses V-IX appear as
Phenomena in the second and third editions. Hypothesis IV appears as Hypothesis I and
reads, “The center of the system of the world is at rest.” Concerning it Newton writes,
“This is acknowledged by all . . . ” About Hypothesis I Harper writes, “Clearly, Newton is
not endorsing this claim . . . ” (p. 98). Thus, according to Harper, we can’t take Newton
at his word. And somehow the reader of the first edition, without any clue whatsoever, is
supposed to figure out that Newton affirms Hypotheses I-III and V-IX, but not Hypothesis
IV. Moreover, Newton’s A Treatise of the System of the World , reads:
. . . the common center of gravity of [the solar system] (by Cor. 4 of the Laws
of motion) will either be quiescent, or move uniformly forward in a right
line: In which case the whole system will likewise move uniformly forward
in right lines. But this hypothesis is hardly to be admitted. And therefore
setting it aside, that common center will be quiescent . . . (Newton [1731]
2004, p. 49).
Harper simply refuses to take Newton at his word when it comes to absolute space and
motion. He claims that the distinction between absolute rest and motion “allows him
to, provisionally, make sense of earth-centered and sun-centered hypotheses” (p. 98) and
“Newton’s solution to the two chief world systems problem does not depend on his hy-
pothesis that the center of the system of the world is at rest” (p. 311). Harper believes
the problem is solved by fixing “the true motions of these bodies among themselves” (p.
311). Even if the oxymoron is removed by talking about motions relative to the center of
mass of the solar system, it still does not solve the problem: the problem, at least as it
was conceived of in the 17th century, presupposes a distinction between true and merely
apparent motion (whether one believes in absolute space or not) with no tertium quid . The
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predicates “x moves (truly)” and “x is at rest” were, with the possible exception of Huy-
gens, universally regarded as complete and contradictory predicates. In catholic countries,
one had to be most careful as to what one predicated them of, as Galileo and Descartes
knew full well. Again, Harper’s Newton is hardly the historical Newton.
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